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Abstract
This paper explores empirically what factors influence a firm’s decision to con-
tribute and to take leadership in open source projects. Increasing firms’ participation
in the development of open source software (OSS) is generally perceived as a puz-
zle. Assuming that firms face a ”Make-or-Buy” decision before using OSS, we argue
that contribution is in fact the best way for them to keep control of their supplier in a
context where incomplete open source licenses govern transactions. Building on this
proposition, we derive predictions on the drivers of firms’ contribution and leader-
ship in open source projects, and test them on a unique dataset of 4,808 open source
projects extracted from Sourceforge. Our empirical findings confirm the predictions
and lend support to our hypotheses.
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The use of open source software (OSS) is quickly becoming commonplace in enterprises.
Ranging from entire software platforms- Linux immediately comes to mind- to Internet
tools, like sendmail or PHP, firms implement a wide array of open source solutions. But
not only is the available software manifold, the firms that use open source are diverse, too.
Among them are large, multinational hardware producers such as IBM, Sun and Nokia
as well as small, medium-sized software vendors. Although commercial open source use
stirs the attention of industry experts and the media, for economists, it does not pose too
big a puzzle. As soon as OSS performs a task well enough, it is a simple substitute for pro-
prietary programs, coming free of charge. Within their supply chain, companies replace
proprietary software with open source alternatives as complements to their products or
a technology input in their production. In fact, little does it surprise then that firms use
OSS.
In contrast, one phenomenon is rather startling: Firms are strongly involved in OSS.
According to a recent study, firms develop 15% of all open source software world-wide
(UNU-MERIT, 2006). More strikingly, Lakhani & Wolf (2005) find that around 40% of
open source developers are paid to contribute to projects. This raises an important ques-
tion: Why do firms participate in open source projects? Open source licenses only grant
few exclusive rights to the licensor. Unlike proprietary licenses, they allow anybody to
download and run the software. Hence, since the source code of OSS is essentially non-
excludable, companies have difficulties appropriating their contributions. They have to
share the returns on their investment with the open source community. This very fact has
spawned a burgeoning field of empirical research (Wichmann, 2002; Bonaccorsi & Rossi,
2003; Dahlander, 2005; Henkel, 2006). The issue of corporate control over open source
projects however has received little attention as yet.
Control and governance are important aspects in transactions. A traditional transac-
tion generally takes place with fixed product specifications, delivery dates, and fees in case
of non-compliance. Contracts outline the conditions of a transaction and capture foresee-
able circumstances. Under unforeseen circumstances however contracts are incomplete
and transacting partners face uncertainty and the risk of opportunistic behavior ex post.
Trading partners cope with this problem through ex ante arrangements that set the degree
of vertical integration (Williamson, 1967). Control thus arises through contracts and the
governance structure between trading partners.
This is not the case in open source development. Albeit firms and open source projects
transact in terms of applications, new features or bug fixes, the contract, the open source
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license in this case, offers no means of coercion. A company cannot force an open source
community to provide a particular feature, to fix a programming bug or to develop a
project in the direction the firm choses. The license only sets a mutual framework for
collaboration. There is however a way firms may influence open source projects: They
contribute source code. By participating, firms affect the governance structure and can
control their open source transactions.
Companies can tighten their control even further by taking project leadership. Projects
on SourceForge (SF) have a clear hierarchy. Project administrators lead the development.
They can contribute source code, grant developers access to the code base, and ultimately
decide which contribution is accepted in a project. They effectively have control over the
direction the project takes. Developers, on the other hand, only contribute code. They can
neither decide which contribution is accepted nor which version of the project is released.
Our objective is to explore what factors influence a firm’s decision to contribute and
to take project leadership in SF projects. To this end, we relate data on SF projects with
corporate participation and project leadership. Our paper is unique because we can track
these two ways of firm involvement for SF projects. The paper proceeds as follows. We
first present the related literature on corporate control and open source software. Then we
discuss our methodology and the data, after which we interpret our results. Finally, we
conclude our analysis and give an outlook on future research.
Corporate Control and Open Source
The choice of ”Make-or-Buy” is at the core of corporate use of open source software. Al-
though corporate contribution does not necessarily follow from use, it is a nontrivial ele-
ment in the interaction between a company and an open source project. These interactions
rely on rather incomplete contracts, namely the open source licenses. Transactions under
incomplete contracts are prone to uncertainty and opportunistic behavior (Williamson,
1967). To control these transactions, especially if trading partners incur ex ante investments
that are not, or barely, useful for other transactions, further governance arrangements are
needed. These arrangements set the extent to which one trading partner integrates the
other one (Grossman & Hart, 1986). The properties of the transaction are important fac-
tors for integration (Klein, 1998): the investment that is required ex ante, the degree of
uncertainty about the transaction, the complexity of the interaction and its frequency.
Firms and open source communities transact in terms of project improvements, such
as bug fixes or additional features, as well as services, for instance documentation and
support. These transactions are based on incomplete contracts, the open source licenses,
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and hence require additional governance arrangements. Setting up these arrangements
is costly however and so a firm attempts to increase the net value of outsourced technol-
ogy per transaction (Veugelers & Cassiman, 1999). Software production involves strong
economies of scale with large up-front fixed cost and small marginal cost. Hence large
producers can create software at lower cost. Along these lines, we expect to find that
Prediction 1: ...firms are more likely to contribute in large projects. We use the
number of downloads and project age as proxies for the project size.
The necessity to set up governance increases with the extent of incompleteness within
the contract (Williamson, 1967). A contract that covers few contingencies leaves a trading
partner prone to uncertainty and risk of opportunism. She establishes additional control
measures to reduce this risk. An open source contract only provides for a minimal set
of parameters. As a consequence, the more parameters a transaction between firm and
open source community involves the stronger is the need to control through contribution.
Accordingly, we predict that
Prediction 2: ...firms are more likely to contribute in projects that are complex. We
use the number of multiple audiences, of programming languages, of topics
and of feature requests as proxies for the complexity of the transaction and
hence of the incompleteness of the contract.
Open source software can threaten a firm’s competitive advantage (Henkel, 2006). The
use of OSS can give a firm’s rival access to essential information about a product or, in
the worst case, the product itself. This issue is similar to the one firms face in R&D out-
sourcing (Love & Roper, 2002). Potential information leakages in external R&D endanger
a firm’s competitive stance and are an impediment to outsourcing. Therefore external
R&D is more likely for generic technology inputs (Kamien & Zang, 2000). To protect one’s
competitive advantage, a firm outsources R&D efforts that center on process rather than
product innovations. We predict therefore that
Prediction 3: ...firms are more likely to contribute in projects that deal with processes
rather than products. This means that firms prefer projects that target more tech-
nically versed audiences, such as system administrators and developers, than
end-users and product markets.
Appropriation is essential for technology outsourcing (Gooroochurn & Hanley, 2007).
Common means of intellectual property protection are patents, copyrights, secrecy, lead
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time and complementary assets. All of which are also used in the interaction between
companies and open source projects (Dahlander & Magnusson, 2005). Companies can for
example focus on projects with Academic licenses (Raymond, 2001) allowing them not
only to use the contributions from the open source community in proprietary software,
but also to keep their own contribution secret. We contend therefore that
Prediction 4: ...firms are more likely to contribute in projects with Academic licenses.
We divide open source licenses into the categories of Academic, Weak Copyleft
and Strong Copyleft licenses.
Data
Our data base consists of projects posted on SourceForge. SourceForge (SF) is an Internet
platform that acts as an intermediary between project initiators, developers and users
of open source software. It is the largest platform of its kind and includes more than
1,000,000 subscribers and approximately 130,000 projects. Subscription to SF is free and
only needed to participate in any phase of project development, i.e. for fixing a bug,
contributing code or authorizing another release. SF offers the necessary infrastructure
to maintain developer communities, the bandwidth for downloads as well as facilities to
manage mailing lists and search facilities for users.
We focus our analysis on projects that are often downloaded and most actively devel-
oped. Choosing projects that are in the first quartiles of number of developers as well
as of number of downloads, we reduce the dataset to 4,808 projects. Previous studies
(Howison & Crowston, 2004; Lerner & Tirole, 2005; David & Rullani, 2006) show that SF
contains a large number of small or inactive projects. Selecting larger projects may partly
offset the negative bias within SF projects. Lastly, we convert the initial panel data into a
cross-section. We average quantitative variables and use the modes for each category for
qualitative ones.
The unit of observation is the software project. We collect quantitative as well as qual-
itative variables for each project. Quantitative data contains, among others, the number
of developers, the number of downloads and the number of firms. Qualitative data con-
sists of project characteristics such as which type of open source license the project uses,
for which operating system a project is developed or for which audience the project is in-
tended. We observe a time period spanning 21 months from February 2005 until October
2006.
The data comes from two databases: the University of Notre Dame and the FLOSSmole
project. Both databases acquire their statistics from SF. However, the two use different
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methods. While the University of Notre Dame directly obtains monthly snap shoots of
SF’s database, FLOSSmole runs a web application that gathers data from projects’ web
pages. Due to possible technical problems with the websites, the information from the
FLOSSmole project can be slightly less accurate. There is however a severe measurement
error in the University of Notre Dame data. Numbers of downloads and developers are
incorrect and we therefore have to rely on the FLOSSmole data for these two variables.
The email addresses of developers and project leaders are available from the Univer-
sity of Notre Dame database from December 2004 until October 2006. We match email
addresses with user registration for projects and obtain 15,307 top-level domains. These
domain entries are then inserted into an application that fetches the corresponding web-
site and searches for keywords with respect to three different categories: Academic, Corpo-
rate and Private. The list of keywords was obtained through a preliminary search on ten
websites for each respective category. We rank the domains according to the number of
times keywords appear on the website. In the end, we thus obtain 8,007 valid domain and
category pairs. In terms of developers, this means that we relate 20,872 developers with
either one of the categories. From these, we can identify 5,233 corporate developers.
There are two main sources of measurement errors within the data. First, there is a
sample selection bias in the SF data for small and medium-sized projects. Focusing on the
largest projects in terms of downloads and developer subscriptions should alleviate this
problem a little. Without a comparable dataset with projects outside a repository however,
the result cannot be verified for statements on OSS in general.
Second, type I and type II errors on corporate affiliations are likely due the method we
apply. Corporate developers might use their work email addresses for private purposes.
Thus, although we find a corporate affiliation, there is in fact no coordinated firm strategy
on OSS. The potential type II error goes the opposite way. Corporate developers could
use their private email addresses for work related projects. Without interviewing each
developer, there is no possibility of knowing how strong these two effects are. However,
the results could suggest how well our affiliation indicator works. In case either the type
I or II errors are strong, one would expect white noise in the analysis. Thus, by finding
statistically significant results, one could argue that the two errors are relatively small.
Discussion
Descriptive Analysis. Figure 1 shows the distribution of licenses in our sample. Projects
with a Strong Copyleft license are most common (67%). Academic licenses take up 16%,
whereas 16% of the projects run under a Weak Copyleft license. The predominance of
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the Strong Copyleft licenses, especially the GPL license, among projects on SF is well-
documented. This has historic reasons as the GPL is the oldest and best-known open
source license and project initiators, when picking from a myriad of different licenses,
choose the one that they know best. Figure 2 presents the frequency of software platforms
for which the projects are mainly developed. Projects are almost equally often developed
for POSIX operating systems (37%) as for middleware applications (34%). POSIX is a stan-
dard that is compatible with UNIX-like operating systems, such as Linux, BSD or Solaris.
Middleware applications, on the other hand, are platform independent. They are written
in programming languages that are instantaneously read, using third-party software to
interact with the operating system. 23% of all projects are developed for Windows. The
sample also contains projects written for the Mac OS X (3%) and other platforms (3%), for
instance for portable devices.
Figure 1: Proportion of Licenses
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Figure 2: Proportion of Software Platforms
Table 1 presents summary statistics. The number of downloads per project is on aver-
age 14,116 (s.d.: 270,634). Our sample only includes projects that have existed for at least
ten months (320 days) and on average around 3 years (1,232 days). The average num-
bers of corporate developers and project leaders are 1.09 (s.d.: 2.75) and 0.49 (s.d.: 0.93)
respectively. The number of total developers per project, 7.12 (s.d.: 4.79), is rather high
compared to similar research (Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 2003).
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Table 1: Descriptive Analysis
Regression. We estimate a firm’s decision to contribute to an open source project as well
as to provide a project leader. We model the decisions as follows:
Pr(yj = 1|X) = Ψ(Xjβ+ ej) (1)
Ψ is the cumulative distribution function that specifies the distribution of the error
term and Xj is the vector of the explanatory variables. The subscript j distinguishes be-
tween corporate contribution and corporate leadership. We use the same explanatory
variables for both dependent variables. They include the license family under which the
project is maintained, with Academic licenses as the reference, the number of times an ap-
plication has been downloaded, the days a project has been posted on SF, the number of
multiple topics, audiences and programming languages, the audience for which the soft-
ware is intended, where we compare the effects relative to the end-user audience. Lastly,
the type of operating system on which the software runs enters the regression as well.
Assuming a logistic cumulative distribution function of the error term, equation 1 is:




Table 2 a) presents the estimates for corporate contribution. Companies are more likely
to contribute to large projects, i.e. projects that are old and downloaded often. We can-
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not say anything about the propensity to contribute to, let alone start, new projects - the
newest project in our sample is one year old. Still, this lends support to our third pre-
diction. The number of multiple audiences, programming languages and feature requests
have also a positive effect on the likelihood of corporate contribution. These findings sug-
gests that firms attempt to control complex projects through contribution, which main-
tains our second prediction. Moreover, table 2 a) shows that firms are more likely to con-
tribute to projects for technical audiences, such as developers and system administrators.
This finding supports our first prediction that firms focus their outsourcing on process
rather than product innovations. Furthermore, projects with Academic licenses are more
likely to get corporate contributions. This supports our fourth prediction. Unlike Copy-
left licenses, Academic licenses allow firms to reconvert applications into proprietary soft-
ware.
Table 2 b) shows the estimates for corporate leadership. The results are similar to the
ones for corporate contribution. We find that one proxy for project size, project age, as well
as two proxies for the complexity of the transaction, number of audiences and number of
programming languages, are significantly positive, corroborating our earlier findings. We
also see that firms are more likely to lead a project for technical audiences rather than
end-users. This again lends support to our third prediction. Finally, the results show that
firms again favor projects with an Academic license.
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Table 2: Regression Results
(a) Corporate Contribution (b) Corporate Leadership
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Conclusion
The question on how to control open source projects is of paramount importance for cor-
porate strategy in OSS. We attempt to shed light on some aspects of this issue. To do so,
we relate data on open source projects on SF and developers’ corporate background. We
then estimate the decision of corporate contribution and corporate project leadership.
With regards to contribution and project leadership, we find evidence that firms opt
for projects targeted at audiences related to process rather than product fields. Moreover,
firms favor projects with an Academic license. The results suggest as well that firms, be-
cause they are more likely to contribute to highly downloaded and mature applications,
focus on large projects. More complex projects have a higher likelihood of attracting cor-
porate contribution, which suggests that they attempt to enforce control to reduce the risk
of uncertainty.
There are ample points of entry for future research on corporate contribution, control
and OSS. First, the analysis of corporate control on OSS could be enhanced with adding
firm characteristics and refining the measures for project control. Second, the strategic
behavior of firms within open source projects merits further consideration. Do firms co-
operate in common projects or do they drive other companies out of projects? Third, the
interaction between private and corporate developers raises interesting questions on the
development of individual incentives to contribute.
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